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FIRST LOOK
Taxing Multinational Business in Lower-Income Countries
by Michael C. Durst
Motivation for This Book
As the 2008 financial crisis sparked 
widespread public anger toward the world’s large 
companies, investigative news reporters and 
nongovernmental organizations revealed that the 
world’s multinational business groups were 
routinely avoiding hundreds of billions of dollars 
of corporate income tax each year in the countries 
where they conduct business.1 Multinationals 
were accomplishing this by shifting profits from 
countries where they earned their income to zero- 
and low-tax countries where the groups often 
appeared to conduct little if any business activity. 
The profit-shifting payments were not being made 
secretly; to the contrary, tax agencies around the 
world had for many years been aware of them. 
However, under the system of international tax 
laws that has been adopted by virtually every 
country of the world, and has been coordinated 
globally by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, a Paris-based 
organization consisting mainly of the world’s 
wealthiest governments,2 countries’ revenue-
protection agencies could not prevent the income-
shifting.
The reports by news media and by 
nongovernmental organizations tended to focus 
on the effects of tax avoidance in two different 
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Multinational Business in Lower-Income Countries: 
A Problem of Economics, Politics and Ethical 
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months. The book explores a topic that has been 
highly controversial in recent years: the use by 
multinational companies of “base erosion and 
profit shifting” tax planning structures to 
reduce their tax liabilities in countries where 
they conduct business, including the world’s 
lower-income developing countries. In this 
installment, which is Chapter 1, the author 
provides an introduction to BEPS and an 
overview of the book.
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this book through a grant to the International 
Centre for Tax and Development. The opinions 
stated in this book are those of the author, and 
should not be attributed to any other person or 
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Copyright 2018 Michael C. Durst.
1
See, e.g., Christian Aid, “False Profits: Robbing the Poor to Keep the 
Rich Tax-Free,” (2009); ActionAid, “Calling Time: Why SABMiller 
Should Stop Dodging Taxes in Africa” (2010; updated 2012) (reports by 
nongovernmental organizations); and Charles Duhigg and David 
Kalinowski, “How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes,” The New York 
Times, Apr. 28, 2012; Jesse Drucker, “IRS Auditing How Google Shifted 
Profits,” Bloomberg.com, Oct. 13, 2013; and Hugo Duncan and Tamara 
Cohen, “Starbucks ‘Treats Tax Like a Church Collection Plate’: Treasury 
Chief Secretary Attacks Coffee Chain,” Daily Mail, Dec. 9, 2012 (news 
articles).
2
OECD member countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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groups of countries. Media reports generally 
emphasized the effects of profit-shifting on 
wealthier industrialized countries. Following the 
financial crisis, the governments of many of these 
countries were experiencing fiscal shortfalls. 
Some especially widely noted news reports 
focused on well-known U.S. companies, 
including Starbucks, Amazon, and Google, that 
were earning large revenues from sales in the 
United Kingdom while paying little if any 
corporate tax there.3
The reports by nongovernmental 
organizations, on the other hand, focused on the 
effects of profit-shifting from the world’s poorer 
developing countries. These countries typically 
face a chronic shortage of public infrastructure to 
meet people’s most basic human needs, in areas 
like the supply of clean drinking water, health 
care and primary education. The 
nongovernmental organizations argued that by 
depriving countries of the financial means to 
build infrastructure in these and other areas, 
corporate tax avoidance was effectively 
perpetuating widespread personal suffering. One 
report, for example, suggested that if corporate 
tax avoidance were to be eliminated, the deaths of 
tens of thousands of children annually might be 
prevented.4
Some of the media and NGO reports 
acknowledged that the profit-shifting they were 
describing generally was “legal,” in the sense that 
it was permissible under the tax laws of the 
countries that were involved. Nevertheless, the 
authors of the reports made no attempt to conceal 
their belief that the tax avoidance reflected moral 
failure on the part of a number of politically 
powerful actors: the multinational companies that 
engaged in the avoidance; the lawyers, 
accountants and other tax professionals who 
advised them; the OECD and other 
intergovernmental groups that had perpetuated 
ineffective tax laws; and national governments 
that seemed content to retain those laws on their 
statute books despite their apparent failure to 
contain revenue losses.
The media and NGO reports generated a 
strong public reaction, especially in the 
economically developed world. Parliamentarians 
in some countries conducted inquiries at which 
legislators were highly critical of the world’s most 
prominent multinational corporations. In one 
widely reported instance, for example, a senior 
U.K. Member of Parliament criticized U.S. 
multinationals Starbucks, Amazon, and Google as 
having fallen short of basic ethical standards in 
engaging in tax-avoidance practices, 
notwithstanding that the avoidance appeared 
legally permissible. “We are not accusing you of 
being illegal,” the M.P. declared, “we are accusing 
you of being immoral.”5
In response to these developments, in 2012, 
the finance ministers of the G20 group of 
countries6 directed the OECD to conduct a multi-
year inquiry into the phenomenon of what the 
OECD labelled “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,” 
or “BEPS.” Senior officials of both the G20 and the 
OECD expressed the view that BEPS-style tax 
planning around the world was eroding public 
confidence in national and global economic 
institutions, and should no longer be tolerated. 
The OECD began its study of base erosion and 
profit shifting in 2013, promising a thorough 
reassessment of the body of international tax laws 
3
See, e.g., the article from the Daily Mail cited at note 1 supra, and the 
BBC report cited at note 5 infra.
4
Christian Aid, “Death and Taxes: The True Toll of Tax Dodging” 
(2008) at 2. The report claims that if tax revenues lost in developing 
countries to two forms of corporate behavior – “legal” avoidance of the 
kind addressed in this book, and certain criminal tax avoidance 
consisting of the falsification of trade documents – could be recovered, 
“then the lives of 350,000 children under the age of five would be saved 
every year – including 250,000 babies” (emphasis in original).
The quantitative analysis of the Christian Aid study has been 
criticized, and the report may substantially overstate the revenue losses 
that countries experience from corporate tax avoidance. See Clemens 
Fuest and Nadine Riedel, “Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax 
Expenditures in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature,” 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (2009); and Maya 
Forstater, “Can Stopping ‘Tax Dodging’ by Multinational Enterprises 
Close the Gap in Development Finance?” Center for Global 
Development (2015).
Moreover, it must be remembered that increased corporate tax 
revenues alone will not necessarily improve social well-being in a 
country. It is also necessary that the revenues be used to meet unmet 
social needs, rather than being misappropriated through corruption and 
inefficiency. See, e.g., Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “Why Do 
Developing Countries Tax So Little?” 28 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
99, 113 (2014). This book will include reminders at a number of places 
that effective tax policy represents only one among many requirements 
for the alleviation of poverty in the world’s poorest countries.
5
See, e.g., BBC, “Starbucks, Google and Amazon Grilled Over Tax 
Avoidance” (Nov. 12, 2012).
6
The G20 countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.
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that the OECD historically had been responsible 
for articulating and maintaining.
Although the OECD draws its membership 
from the world’s wealthiest countries, the OECD 
acknowledged that revenue losses from base 
erosion and profit shifting were affecting 
developing countries especially acutely. The 
OECD therefore invited developing-country 
governments to participate in the BEPS studies. In 
addition, intergovernmental organizations active 
in the field of international development, 
including the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
United Nations, collaborated with the OECD and 
produced several extensive analyses that focused 
particularly on the situation of developing 
countries with respect to corporate profit shifting.
In late 2015, the OECD issued final reports 
from its BEPS studies, recommending a number 
of legislative and administrative measures that 
governments might take to curtail the shifting of 
income by multinational groups. In addition, a 
consortium of intergovernmental organizations, 
including the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the United Nations, pledged to join in a 
sustained program of technical assistance, to help 
the world’s developing countries implement the 
BEPS recommendations and otherwise improve 
the performance of their tax systems.
This book seeks to provide a critical, and in 
some ways novel, assessment of base erosion and 
profit shifting as it affects the world’s lower-
income countries,7 and of the current efforts of the 
OECD and other international organizations to 
curtail the phenomenon. I write this book from 
the belief that the advocacy of NGOs and others, 
described above, performed a valuable service in 
bringing the tax situation of lower-income 
countries to greater public attention. I believe as 
well, however, that the problems of corporate 
taxation in lower-income countries reflect a 
longstanding, complex, and stubborn mix of 
political and economic influences, and that the 
post-2008 public exposure represented only the 
beginning of a still incomplete process of 
understanding the roots of the problems that have 
been identified. As will be discussed below, 
largely through the OECD’s BEPS process, 
progress has been made toward improving the 
performance of the corporate income tax in lower-
income countries, but the process of reform has 
only begun. The BEPS process has to date been 
unable to address some of the most central 
difficulties faced by lower-income countries, and 
some of the fundamental political and economic 
causes of those difficulties have not yet been 
sufficiently aired and confronted.
The Book’s Fundamental Argument
This book addresses three fundamental 
questions:
• Would curtailing base erosion and profit 
shifting in lower-income countries be in the 
interest of the people of those countries, 
especially in facilitating the alleviation of 
poverty?
• What are the political and economic roots of 
BEPS-style corporate tax planning?
• What policies might lower-income countries 
realistically pursue to reduce their 
vulnerability to base erosion and profit 
shifting?
With respect to the first of these questions, the 
book concludes that BEPS-style tax planning does 
properly demand the continuing attention of 
policymakers around the world. The world’s 
poorer countries are chronically short of the 
public revenues needed to combat persistent 
severe poverty, and as a practical matter the 
income generated by multinational companies 
within those countries represents one of the few 
realistically accessible sources of additional 
public funding, at least for the foreseeable future. 
There are limits, of course, to the extent that 
lower-income governments should seek to 
increase corporate tax revenues above current 
levels: at some level of increased corporate 
taxation, the social costs of reduced inbound 
7
A note is in order about the use by this book of the term “lower-
income” countries. It might be possible instead to use the term 
“developing” countries, but this term is used popularly to describe 
countries at many different levels of per capita income, some of which 
are relatively wealthy by global standards. The World Bank uses the 
terms “low-income” (per capita income of $1,005 or less for fiscal year 
2017-18); “lower-middle-income” (per capita income of $1,006 to $3,955), 
“upper-middle-income” (per capita income of $3,956 to $12,235) and 
“high-income” (per capita income of at least $12,236). I use “lower-
income” to denote countries falling roughly within the low- and lower-
middle-income groups. (For the World Bank classification, see World 
Bank, “World Bank Country and Lending Groups.”) It should be 
recognized that each World Bank category includes countries of widely 
varying levels of per capita income and social conditions, so that my use 
of the term “lower-income” inevitably encompasses countries that differ 
from one another in many important ways.
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investment will override the social benefits of 
generating additional revenue. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, however, profit-shifting 
has become so pervasive in lower-income 
countries that corporate tax revenues today are 
almost certainly below socially optimal levels.
Therefore, curtailing BEPS-style tax avoidance 
should increase the likelihood of gains in social 
welfare for people in lower-income countries. 
This is not to say that increases in government 
revenues will lead inevitably to improvements in 
social conditions; many obstacles, including 
corruption and other shortfalls in governance, can 
obstruct the path between the collection of 
revenues and their successful use in promoting 
social well-being. Nevertheless, enhanced 
revenues should make badly needed social 
improvements more feasible than they are today, 
and for this reason curtailing tax avoidance in 
lower-income countries appears to represent a 
desirable policy goal.
With respect to the political and economic 
roots of BEPS-style tax planning, the conceptual 
core of this book consists of an historical 
interpretation of the phenomenon. The history of 
profit-shifting is a remarkably long one: all the 
techniques by which multinational groups 
currently use subsidiaries in zero- and low-tax 
countries in avoidance planning were already in 
use within a few years after the end of World War 
II, when the cessation of hostilities and wartime 
technological innovations permitted a flowering 
of cross-border trade and investment. I argue in 
this book that BEPS-style tax avoidance can be 
understood most usefully not primarily as a 
product of corporate wrongdoing, but rather as a 
consequence of the longstanding desires (i) of 
taxpayers to minimize their liabilities, and (ii) of 
the governments of countries at all levels of 
economic development to encourage investment 
by offering companies full or partial exemptions 
from corporate taxation.
To some extent, countries offer investors tax 
exemptions through explicit means, for example 
by enacting laws permitting “tax holidays” for 
investments in new businesses, or tax exemptions 
for starting businesses in economically 
disadvantaged areas within a country (“special 
economic zones”). All governments, however, 
face some degree of political resistance to the use 
of explicit tax exemptions to attract investment, 
on grounds that the governments are showing 
excessive largesse to corporate interests. I argue in 
this book that the techniques that multinational 
companies employ to avoid taxes through the use 
of zero- and low-tax subsidiaries, and the 
international system of tax laws that protects the 
avoidance from successful challenge by revenue 
authorities, evolved as a means by which 
companies could obtain, and governments could 
tacitly provide, de facto exemptions from taxation 
with less political visibility than is entailed in 
explicit tax incentives.
My interpretation of base erosion and profit 
shifting as reflecting not only the desire of 
multinational companies to avoid taxes, but also 
the desire of governments to facilitate that 
avoidance to encourage inbound investment, 
raises the question whether the recommendation 
that the international community take steps to 
curtail the avoidance incorporates an undesirable 
element of paternalism. After all, if governments 
of lower-income countries have tolerated high 
levels of avoidance for many years, on the view 
that the resulting encouragement of investment 
outweighs the potential social value of increased 
investment, what standing do NGOs, journalists, 
tax scholars, and international organizations like 
the OECD, IMF, and World Bank have to 
encourage lower-income governments to try to 
curtail avoidance?
An answer to this question is found, I believe, 
in the nature – indeed, in the elementary 
mathematics – of international tax competition. If 
lower-income countries did not see themselves as 
competing with their neighbors to attract inbound 
investment, they presumably could drive a 
tougher tax deal with investing multinationals, 
increasing the amount of corporate tax revenues 
closer to socially optimal levels. But in fact, 
virtually all countries are eager to attract inbound 
investment, and whatever level of taxation a 
country might be willing to offer a potentially 
investing multinational, one or more other 
countries often will be willing to offer a lower 
level of taxation. The result is in effect a kind of 
auction, a “race to the bottom,” in which 
governments perceive little practical alternative 
but to permit investing companies to engage in 
some measure of tax avoidance.
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In view of all this, it seems clear that a 
successful mix of policy initiatives to enhance 
corporate tax revenues in lower-income countries 
will need to include measures by which countries 
can to some extent be shielded from the pressures 
of tax competition. There really is only one way in 
which market competition, of which international 
tax competition is a species, can be mitigated, and 
that is by some degree of coordination among 
market competitors. Thus, for example, if lower-
income governments could bargain with 
multinational groups not individually but instead 
as a bloc, they could in theory obtain agreement 
on a level of corporate taxation that would 
optimally balance the competing goals of raising 
public revenues and maintaining a favorable 
environment for investment. Currently, little 
coordination of tax policies is in effect among 
lower-income countries, and given persistent 
pressures of tax competition, the degree of 
coordination that is possible is likely to remain 
limited for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it 
seems unavoidable that lower-income countries 
will need to achieve some degree of additional 
policy coordination, especially on a regional basis, 
if they are to implement policies to better shield 
themselves from BEPS-style tax avoidance.
And achieving this degree of enhanced 
market coordination is unlikely to occur without 
assistance and encouragement from parties in 
addition to lower-income countries themselves. 
We see today the inevitable result of leaving 
lower-income countries to counter the presence of 
tax competition without the support of outside 
intervention: the race to the bottom continues to 
operate largely unimpeded, leading to very high 
volumes of corporate income-shifting. Better 
results will require more effective political 
counterweights to the forces of international tax 
competition; and those counterweights will need 
to be provided not only by the world’s lower-
income countries themselves, but also by other 
politically empowered groups that are involved in 
the international tax lawmaking process.
In other words, it seems inescapable that 
substantial increases in corporate tax revenues for 
lower-income countries will require political 
acceptance, and even proactive political support, 
from multinational companies and the 
governments of their home countries. This will 
involve the willingness of business interests, 
acting in concert, to refrain from exercising the 
full measure of economic power that tax 
competition affords them in their dealings with 
lower-income countries. In doing so, companies 
will need to be motivated not only by economic 
but also by normative goals. Essentially, a political 
consensus will need to be reached that current 
corporate tax laws and practices generate revenue 
at levels below those that can support socially 
desirable programs for the alleviation of poverty. 
Companies would therefore acquiesce in 
measured and predictable measures to increase 
the tax bases of lower-income countries for the 
same reason that they cooperate in, for example, 
international efforts to prohibit child labor or 
harmful environmental practices.
As will be discussed later in this book, the idea 
that multinational companies should voluntarily 
acquiesce to laws that limit their exercise of 
economic power in the tax context is bound to 
elicit political opposition. Asking companies’ 
partial, voluntary forbearance from tax 
competition could be seen as an interference with 
global market mechanisms, which to some may be 
objectionable in itself. In addition, self-restraint by 
companies in the reduction of their tax liabilities 
could be seen as effecting a redistribution of 
income from the shareholders of multinational 
companies to the populations of lower-income 
countries, which also may meet opposition. 
Nevertheless, some degree of forbearance on the 
part of business interests, from taking full 
advantage of the opportunities presented by tax 
competition, seems to me indispensable if the 
performance of the corporate tax in low-income 
countries is to be meaningfully improved.
I need to defer detailed comment on the third 
question that this book addresses, of the specific 
corporate tax policy initiatives which might prove 
most useful to lower-income countries, until 
forthcoming chapters have provided additional 
background. Even at this preliminary stage, 
however, one common-sense prerequisite for 
effective international tax policies can be 
mentioned. Above all else, successful policy 
initiatives must be far less complicated than those 
that currently govern the taxation of cross-border 
trade and investment around the world. Later 
chapters of this book will argue that today’s 
For more Tax Notes International content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
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international laws have evolved over decades to 
generate rather than reduce complexity and 
unpredictability of application, and that this 
tendency has greatly impaired efforts both to 
enforce the law, and to reform it legislatively, in 
countries around the world. The undue 
complexity of current law is problematic in 
countries of all levels of economic development, 
but the difficulties posed are especially serious for 
lower-income countries, which have limited 
resources to support both tax administration and 
legislative analysis.
There will be limits to the simplification of 
international tax laws. The many different kinds 
of business transactions engaged in by 
multinational companies often are inherently 
complex and therefore require a certain 
irreducible amount of complexity in the tax laws. 
Moreover, the enactment of tax laws typically 
requires political compromise, and compromise 
often results in legal provisions that, because of 
ambiguity, can be difficult to apply. Nevertheless, 
current international tax rules have evolved 
toward obscurantism as an end in itself. A new 
generation of international tax laws should be 
judged in significant part by the simplicity and 
transparency of their structure.
The main policy recommendations of this 
book all will involve simplification. For example, 
when examining the OECD’s recent BEPS process, 
I will focus on two initiatives that the OECD has 
either recommended or addressed 
sympathetically in its work: proposals to simplify 
the manner in which tax authorities may apply 
“transfer pricing” rules,8 and rules placing 
quantitative limits on the amount of interest 
payments that corporations are permitted to 
deduct. These BEPS-related initiatives represent 
well-conceived attempts to reduce the complexity 
of current laws and can, I think, offer lower-
income countries meaningful practical benefits.
I would extend the principle of simplification, 
however, beyond the policy initiatives that have 
figured during the recent BEPS discussions. In 
particular, in Chapter 5, I will explore the 
possibility of a relatively simple statutory 
“overlay” that a country might place atop the 
more complex body of existing international-tax 
rules, to ensure that reasonable minimum levels 
of tax revenue can be collected even from 
companies that engage heavily in profit-shifting. 
Precedent for these kinds of overlays is provided 
by the “alternative corporate minimum taxes,” 
based on gross revenue (turnover) rather than net 
income, that some developing-country 
governments have been applying for decades. 
Revenue yields from the minimum taxes could be 
calibrated so as to generate significant benefits to 
lower-income countries while remaining below 
levels that would be expected unduly to 
discourage inbound investment.
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the 
minimum-tax approach has potential drawbacks 
and limitations. Among other things, its use of 
gross revenue as a base poses some economic 
disadvantages, particularly in placing some 
taxpayers at risk of taxation even in the absence of 
profits. Also, implementation of the minimum tax 
could, like all potential measures that would 
increase tax revenues, be impeded by pressures of 
tax competition. In addition, more must be 
learned about countries’ experiences to date with 
the alternative corporate minimum tax; given that 
it has been in use for many years, surprisingly 
little research is available on how it has performed 
in practice. Nevertheless, under current political 
and economic circumstances, more widespread 
use of the tax may offer promise for lower-income 
countries, and it should be given careful 
consideration in international reform efforts. This 
book will suggest how minimum-tax proposals 
might be effectively researched and developed 
and, possibly, implemented by more countries on 
an internationally coordinated basis.
This Book’s Intended Audience
I hope that this book will be useful to both 
specialists in the field of international taxation 
and, probably more importantly, to non-
specialists who generally are conversant with 
questions related to public finance and 
international development, but who are not 
familiar with the complexities of international tax 
laws and practice. The body of laws that protects 
8
“Transfer pricing” laws govern the question whether the different 
companies within multinational groups deal fairly with one another (on 
an “arm’s-length” basis), so that income is not shifted artificially to 
affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions. Transfer pricing laws have become 
especially complicated over the years; they are discussed in some detail 
in chapters 3 and 4.
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the institution of base erosion and profit shifting 
has survived for more than sixty years in part 
because it is protected by an impressive layer of 
verbal camouflage. The legal guidelines and other 
official documents that memorialize the current 
system reach remarkable heights of verbosity and 
circumlocution, raising forbidding obstacles to 
newcomers who desire to approach the system 
and understand it. Professional insiders, 
therefore, have enjoyed a near-monopoly on 
policymaking in the field of international 
corporate taxation. Non-initiates will need to be 
able to see through the law’s protective covering 
of complexity and gain an understanding of how 
the tax laws function in practice, if the range of 
actors who can participate effectively in 
policymaking is to be widened. Therefore, 
although I try in this book to avoid 
oversimplification, I also try to avoid the 
unnecessary use of specialized terminology. I try 
to summarize legal rules and corporate business 
transactions in relatively straightforward 
language, with technical details consigned to 
footnotes.
There is a limit, however, to the extent that the 
discussion in this book can be simplified (at least 
by me). Even if spurious complexity is pushed 
aside, corporate income taxation, especially in the 
international setting, remains an intrinsically 
complicated topic. I have therefore found the 
effort to keep this book accessible to non-
specialists challenging, and I am certain that at 
best, I have succeeded only partially in doing so. 
Non-specialists (and maybe even specialists), 
therefore, are bound to encounter prickly tangles 
of verbal complexity in journeying through this 
book. For this I apologize and hope that the 
rewards of the trip outweigh any pain 
experienced along the way.
For those international tax specialists who 
might read this book, let me express the hope that 
you will find the discussions stimulating and 
useful, even though much of the analysis that I 
present is likely to be familiar to you. We who 
make careers in the tax field tend to spend much 
of our time and intellectual energy probing the 
law’s minute complexities. We can focus so 
intently on relatively confined, technical topics 
that we risk losing sight of the overall political, 
economic, and ethical matrix in which we work. I 
hope that even the most sophisticated 
international tax specialists will find this book 
helpful in gaining insights into the broad policy 
implications of the work that we do, and of 
possibilities for applying our expertise in new and 
helpful ways.
The Forthcoming Chapters
This book develops its argument in five 
chapters that follow this introduction:
Chapter 2 is entitled “Tax Competition and 
International Tax Planning.” The chapter will 
examine the basic economic dilemma faced by 
lower-income countries with respect to the 
corporate tax, describing the tradeoff raised by 
the conflicting desires for enhanced public 
revenues and to encourage inbound investment. 
The chapter will explore the central policy 
question raised by tax competition in lower-
income countries: namely, whether it can be said 
with confidence that increasing corporate tax 
revenues in lower-income countries is likely to 
promote social wellbeing. Given the ever-present 
tradeoff between raising corporate tax revenues 
and promoting investment, there almost certainly 
are potential levels of corporate taxation that 
would be so high as to generate net damage to 
social well-being in lower-income countries. 
Currently, however, evidence seems persuasive 
that because of the influence of tax competition, 
acting largely through the mechanism of BEPS-
style profit shifting, effective rates of corporate 
taxation in lower-income countries are far below 
socially optimal levels. Therefore, policies that 
would reduce the incidence of profit-shifting from 
lower-income countries should on a net basis be 
expected to increase social wellbeing in those 
countries.
Chapter 2 also will offer an historical 
overview of BEPS-style corporate tax planning, 
describing the origins of the phenomenon in the 
years following World War II and its remarkable 
durability over more than six decades. I will argue 
that BEPS practices arose largely because they 
permitted both multinational companies and 
governments to afford companies de facto tax 
reductions on income derived from cross-border 
investment, but to do so in a relatively 
nontransparent manner. Chapter 2 will offer what 
I hope will be a reasonably accessible, but not 
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overly simplified, explanation of the mechanics of 
tax avoidance based on profit-shifting, outlining 
four basic transactional formats that are present in 
virtually all BEPS-style planning structures.
Chapter 3, entitled “The Evolution of Porous 
International Tax Laws,” will survey the various 
principles of international tax law that are 
intended ostensibly to control profit-shifting 
among members of multinational groups, but 
which instead have evolved over decades to 
insulate profit-shifting from successful legal 
challenge by national tax administrations around 
the world. The discussion in Chapter 3 will focus 
in large measure on the “arm’s-length principle” 
that underlays international “transfer pricing” 
law, as that law is codified in guidelines issued by 
the OECD and followed by national governments 
around the world. Transfer pricing laws are 
supposed to provide tax authorities the means of 
limiting, to economically reasonable levels, the 
amounts that companies can deduct for payments 
made to foreign affiliates. Chapter 3 will argue, 
however, that today’s arm’s-length transfer 
pricing rules contain obvious conceptual and 
technical anomalies that excessively limit their 
usefulness to tax authorities in many real-life tax 
audits. Chapter 3 will review the historical 
development of the OECD’s transfer pricing laws 
in an effort to pinpoint the political origin of those 
parts of the rules that are most problematic in the 
developing-country setting.
In addition to transfer pricing laws, Chapter 3 
will explore other areas of tax law that are 
important to an understanding of base erosion 
and profit shifting. These include “controlled 
foreign corporation” rules, by which 
governments sometimes have sought to prevent 
their home-based multinationals from availing 
themselves of profit-shifting avoidance 
techniques in countries where the multinationals 
conduct business. In theory, CFC rules offer a 
means by which the home countries of 
multinationals could, by coordinating their 
legislation, effectively end BEPS-style avoidance 
by prohibiting their multinationals from 
participating in it. In fact, however, there has been 
little if any collaboration among capital-exporting 
governments to prevent their multinationals from 
engaging in tax avoidance around the world. 
Governments instead have feared that by 
subjecting their home-based multinationals to 
effective CFC legislation, they might place those 
multinationals at a competitive disadvantage 
with respect to multinationals based in other 
countries, where effective CFC legislation is not in 
effect. As a result, although many countries 
maintain CFC rules on their statute books, the 
rules tend to be riddled with exceptions and other 
vulnerabilities, so that BEPS-style avoidance has 
been permitted to flourish despite the existence of 
these laws.
In its discussion of CFC rules, Chapter 3 will 
address a recently prominent variation on the 
CFC approach, the minimum tax on companies’ 
foreign income (the global intangible low-tax 
income, or “GILTI,” tax) that is included in 
recently enacted U.S. tax reform legislation. 
Chapter 3 will consider whether the enactment of 
the GILTI tax by the United States may trigger 
what amounts to an international revival of the 
CFC approach, which might to some extent 
reduce the pressures of international tax 
competition on lower-income countries.
Chapter 3 also will examine the remarkably 
permissive laws that for decades have permit 
companies operating around the world to deduct, 
from their taxable incomes, interest that they pay 
on obviously tax-motivated loans extended by 
zero- and low-tax affiliates. Chapter 3 will 
consider why historical attempts to control profit-
shifting through interest payments generally have 
failed, and examines recent efforts by some 
countries – which during the BEPS process were 
endorsed by the OECD – to adopt more effective 
legislation to limit loan-based corporate tax 
avoidance.
Chapter 4 will build on Chapter 3’s 
examination of the legal and political foundations 
of base erosion and profit shifting by assessing the 
extent to which the OECD’s recent BEPS efforts 
offer practical promise for the curtailment of 
corporate profit-shifting from lower-income 
countries. I will argue that inevitably, the BEPS 
process was heavily affected by durable political 
pressures, from various quarters, to retain the 
historically evolved structure of international 
corporate tax law. The BEPS project has therefore 
refrained from recommending fundamental 
revisions to the legal principles that currently 
govern international corporate taxation. In 
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particular, in the BEPS reports, while the OECD 
has devoted considerable critical attention to the 
difficulties posed historically by “arm’s-length” 
transfer pricing laws, the BEPS recommendations 
leave some of the most important problems of 
current law unaddressed.
I nevertheless argue in Chapter 4 that the 
BEPS project has generated a number of policy 
recommendations that offer the prospect for 
significant improvement in the generation of 
corporate tax revenues in lower-income countries. 
First, in an effort to reduce profit-shifting through 
the payment of interest on loans from affiliates, 
the OECD has recommended that countries adopt 
rules disallowing interest deductions that exceed 
a specified percentage of the borrowing 
company’s net income. A number of relatively 
wealthy countries already have adopted 
limitations of this kind; they are relatively simple 
to administer and probably could lead to 
significant revenue gains in lower-income 
countries that are willing to adopt them. In 
addition, notwithstanding the BEPS reports’ 
hesitancy in addressing some central 
shortcomings of transfer pricing laws, I believe 
that plans of the OECD and other donor groups to 
provide technical assistance in simplifying the 
administration of transfer pricing rules – 
particularly the “transactional net margin 
method” under the existing OECD guidelines – 
offer some practical benefits for lower-income 
countries and should be pursued. Similarly, I 
argue, the plans of the OECD and other 
organizations to engage in “capacity building” in 
the area of transfer pricing administration, while 
limited in their potential effects by remaining 
deficiencies in underlying laws, nevertheless offer 
promise for net benefits in lower-income 
countries and should be pursued.
I argue as well in Chapter 4 that the OECD’s 
recommendations for improving the performance 
of international tax treaties offer limited, but still 
significant, potential benefits to lower-income 
countries.
Finally in Chapter 4, I consider the extent to 
which various developments related to but not 
part of the BEPS process might reduce demand for 
BEPS-style tax planning among multinational 
groups, thereby reducing the pressures of tax 
competition on lower-income countries. These 
developments include growing concerns by 
multinational companies regarding the 
reputational effects of BEPS-style tax planning; 
actions within the European Union to limit 
member countries’ participation in tax planning 
structures; and the recently enacted GILTI tax in 
the United States, which may reduce U.S. groups’ 
tax benefits from overseas profit-shifting 
arrangements.
Chapter 5 seeks to build on the analysis of 
prior chapters by suggesting a program of 
potentially useful policy instruments for lower-
income countries. My recommendations are 
based on the overall assessment (which I believe 
generally underlies the BEPS studies) that the 
problem of profit-shifting is extraordinarily 
complicated, politically as well as technically, and 
that meaningful progress against it is likely to 
arise from a combination of incremental legal 
reforms, rather than a “big fix” consisting of a 
fundamental re-design of the prevailing system of 
international tax laws. In accordance with this 
view, Chapter 5 will consider how countries 
might best implement the OECD’s recommended 
initiatives that will have been discussed in 
Chapter 4: (i) limitations on interest deductions; 
(ii) simplification of transfer pricing methods; (iii) 
capacity-building, mainly in the area of transfer-
pricing enforcement; and (iv) the adjustment of 
national policies relating to income tax treaties.
In addition, Chapter 5 considers the potential 
benefits and limitations of the use, by additional 
countries, of an alternative corporate minimum 
tax (ACMT) applied at a low rate (for example, 1 
percent) applied to a taxpayer’s gross revenue 
(turnover) rather than its net income. Because no 
deductions are allowed under a turnover-based 
tax, a turnover-based tax would be immune from 
avoidance through BEPS-style deductible 
payments of any kind, including not only 
royalties and service fees but also interest. 
Moreover, as will be explained in Chapter 5, a 
turnover-based ACMT also should be effective 
against tax planning based on the undervaluation 
of products shipped from a country, including 
natural-resource and agricultural products. 
Further, the relative simplicity of a minimum tax 
suggests that it might be well-suited to 
coordinated implementation among groups of 
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countries, thereby to some extent relieving 
pressures of tax competition.
Chapter 5 will conclude by offering brief 
comments on the taxation of some industries that 
often are of great importance to the economies of 
lower-income countries. These include natural 
resource extraction, electronic commerce, mobile 
telecommunications, and banking and insurance. 
There has been a great deal of specialized study of 
taxation of these industries, and this book cannot 
attempt to discuss them in detail. Nevertheless, 
Chapter 5 will offer a brief explanation of the 
special problems that taxation of these industries 
present, as well as ways that have been 
considered to alleviate these problems.
Chapter 6 will conclude this book with 
observations on the possibility of generating the 
political will, among the various interested actors, 
that will be needed to implement even limited 
measures to curtail profit shifting as it currently 
affects lower-income countries. Today’s virtually 
universal use of BEPS-style tax planning among 
multinational companies reflects the operation 
over many decades of two mutually reinforcing 
kinds of competition: competition among 
countries to attract business investment, and 
competition among multinational businesses to 
minimize their tax burdens in countries where 
they operate. Together, these two kinds of 
competition have constrained corporate tax 
receipts in lower-income countries at levels that 
seem significantly lower than would be socially 
optimal.
In light of the persistence of both kinds of 
competition, it seems inevitable that meaningful 
enhancements of corporate tax revenue in lower-
income countries will require a supportive 
consensus among the major stakeholders in the 
global corporate tax system. These include 
businesses and business organizations, the 
national governments of both industrialized and 
developing countries, intergovernmental 
organizations like the OECD, IMF, World Bank, 
and United Nations, and regional associations of 
developing-country governments. What is 
needed is, essentially, an extension of the recent 
BEPS negotiations, but with a focus specifically on 
the needs of lower-income countries.
Chapter 6 will consider, from an ethical 
perspective, both the desirability of this kind of 
effort and the likelihood that support for it can be 
gathered from both the governmental and 
private-sector actors who would need to 
implement it. Does there exist a moral duty to 
assist lower-income countries in improving the 
performance of their corporate tax systems, even 
at the financial expense of both the governments 
of other countries and multinational companies 
themselves? Further, if a duty of this kind exists, 
who specifically bears the responsibility of 
seeking to implement it, and in what ways? No 
piece of writing, including this book, can pretend 
to answer questions like these definitively, or to all 
readers’ satisfaction. Nevertheless, I hope that the 
observations offered in Chapter 6 will prove 
helpful to those who seek to build a pragmatic 
policy framework for improving the performance 
of corporate income taxation in lower-income 
countries. 
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